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BELAS Summer School 2018

Panels

PANEL 1: Hardware Security and Trust
Coordinator:TBD

Participants:
- Ramesh Karri, Polytechnic Institute of New York University, USA
- Farshad Khorrami, Electrical & Computer Engineering Department at New York University, USA
- Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Computer Science at the Technische Universit├Ąt Darmstadt, Germany

Summary:

From information security point of view embedded circuits and systems are operating in a potentially hostile environment. Therefore, development of such embedded parts is a complex task that often requires expert solutions. This panel discusses three aspects of security systems:

-Biochip Security: This topic will explore the security implications of biochips that are envisioned for use in lab-on-chips. It will be discussed how attackers in the bio-chip supply chain can undermine proprietary biochemical protocols or alter their results, with serious consequences for laboratory analysis, healthcare, and biotechnology innovation.

-CyberPhysical Systems Security: This topic will explore challenges and new directions in design, modeling, simulation, and practical applications of the next-generation cyber-security mechanisms for embedded controls in CPS (specific topics of interest are outlined below). The final goal is to provide a reader a broad perspective of the state-of-the-art in the field from both academic and industrial viewpoints. The presentation will span the wide gamut of crucial facets including theoretical foundations, experimental implementations, and practical deployments in the industry.

-Losing Control:on the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity under Stack Attacks:
Adversaries exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to hijack a program's control flow and gain arbitrary code execution. One promising mitigation, control-flow integrity (CFI), has been the subject of extensive research in the past decade. One of the core findings is that adversaries can construct Turing-complete code-reuse attacks against coarse-grained CFI policies because they admit control flows that are not part of the original program. This insight led the research community to focus on fine-grained CFI implementations. In this topic, it will be shown how to exploit heap-based vulnerabilities to control the stack content including security-critical values used to validate control-flow transfers. Our investigation shows that although program analysis and compiler-based mitigations reduced stack-based vulnerabilities, stack-based memory corruption remains an open problem. Using the Chromium web browser we demonstrate real-world attacks against various CFI implementations: 1) against CFI implementations under Windows 32-bit by exploiting unprotected context switches, and 2) against state-of-the-art fine-grained CFI implementations (IFCC and VTV) in the two premier open-source compilers under Unix-like operating systems. Both 32 and 64-bit x86 CFI checks are vulnerable to stack manipulation. Finally, it is provided an exploit technique against the latest shadow stack implementation.



PANEL 2: The Use of COTS for Space Applications: Benefits and Drawbacks
Coordinator:TBD

Participants:
- Nilberto Medina - USP, Brazil
- Marcilei Aparecida Guazzelli da Silva - FEI, Brazil
- Silvio Manea - INPE, Brazil
- Saulo Finco - CTI, Brazil
- Fabian Vargas - PUCRS, Brazil

Summary:

Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) integrated circuits (ICs) are continuously getting added value in embedded systems for critical applications like aerospace. In several opportunities, they are replacing rad-hard components and are becoming one of the core components. On the other hand, only reliable parts with respect to electromagnetic interference (EMI) & ionizing radiation (TID and SEU) are expected to be incorporated in satellite electronics. Therefore, the qualification process of such parts is becoming an even more challenging task. This panel addresses the challenges of qualifying ICs for EMI and ionizing radiation. Focus is given on the design of the hardware and software required to control the ICs under test, the laboratory infrastructure and existing standards.

 

 







The Organizing Committee, Porto Alegre (Brazil)